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Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose - This study aims to illuminate the challenges involved in implementing Community 
Benefits (CBs), a sustainable public procurement policy that ensures that there are positive 
social and economic outcomes for the local community when public money is spent on 
goods, works and services. 
 
Design/methodology/approach - Interviews and focus groups were conducted with public 
sector buyers and suppliers in Wales with experience in implementing CBs. Resource 
dependence theory was used to examine the extent to which dependence on resources effects 
CBs implementation.  
 
Findings - Whilst the study confirms that implementation of CBs improves economic and 
social outcomes, there can also be challenges for public sector organisations and their 
constituent supply chains. These include tensions between CBs and other policies, differing 
views between buyers and suppliers, and the unintended consequences of promoting one 
form of CBs over another. 
 
Research and practical limitations/implications – The research found that the Welsh 
Government influences the buyer-supplier dyad through regulatory and financial power. We 
elaborate on resource dependency theory by adding four constructs (powerful stakeholders, 
intra and inter organisational issues, challenges, and enablers) to better understand the flows 
of power and resources in this research context. Buyer and supplier practitioners may find the 
factors leading to successful CBs implementation useful, such as ensuring closer 
communication and liaison at early contract stages.  
 
Originality/value - This study addresses the need for research into how public sector 
organisations and suppliers seek to implement socio-economic sustainability measures, and 
the lack of research on CBs implementation to date. It is also novel in adopting a dyadic 
approach and a resource dependency perspective.  
 
 
Keywords Community Benefits, Socio-economic sustainability, Public sector, Resource 
Dependence theory. 
 
Paper type Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
A range of legislative and policy instruments exist in the UK to drive sustainable public 
procurement. However, relatively few published studies have examined the effect of such 
procurement policies on supply chains or the barriers faced by organisations seeking to 
realise socioeconomic value through procurement (Eadie, McKeown, & Anderson, 2011; 
Gormly, 2014; Harland, Telgen, Callendar, Grimm, & Patrucco, 2019). One such policy is 
Community Benefits (CBs), described as “socioeconomic criteria that are inserted into supply 
contracts” (p.217, Preuss, 2009). Examples include suppliers providing apprenticeships, and 
public sector buyers contracting with social enterprises or the voluntary sector (Preuss, 2009). 
     A search of the literature found no published academic research that has focused on the 
challenges of implementing socioeconomic CBs. The majority of previous research has been 
concerned with the environmental or economic aspects of sustainable supply chain 
management (SSCM) in a private sector context (Miemczyk, Johnsen, & Macquet, 2012). 
Although studies have previously examined how public sector organisations can obtain wider 
value for money through public procurement (McKevitt & Davis, 2016; Preuss, 2009), to 
date there has been little research focusing on the impact on SSCM within the public sector 
(Harland et al., 2019). This omission is important since public procurement represents big 
spend, at about 15-20% GDP globally (UNECE, 2020).  
     This study seeks to contribute to the sustainable procurement and SSCM fields by 
exploring the following research question: 
What are the factors influencing the implementation of CBs in public procurement?  
     To identify the factors affecting CBs, we also investigate the enablers and challenges of 
CBs implementation. In addition, this study seeks to explore whether CBs implementation 
involves any unanticipated outcomes, tensions, and trade-offs. Public procurement is 
challenged with meeting a number of different and competing goals, such as achieving value 
for money, striving for transparency in the procurement process, procuring quality products 
and services, and including sustainability criteria. It is important to understand the pressures 
that may unduly influence CBs implementation.  
 This study makes several contributions. First, it is one of an emerging group of academic 
studies to address social public procurement issues (Bernal, San-Jose, & Luis Retolaza, 2019; 
Furneaux & Barraket, 2014; Loosemore, 2016; Meehan & Bryde, 2015), and within those 
social public procurement studies we could find no studies to date that specifically focus on 
CBs. Second, it addresses the lack of dyadic studies in the field of SSCM (Hall, 2000; Huq, 
Stevenson, & Zorzini, 2014; Zorzini, Hendry, Huq, & Stevenson, 2015), by examining both 
buyer and supplier perspectives. Third, relatively few studies concerned with SSCM or public 
procurement develop theoretical insights (Flynn & Davies, 2014; Touboulic & Walker, 2015; 
Zorzini et al., 2015), and this study makes a theoretical contribution by adopting resource 
dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to guide our study of CBs. Finally, it 
provides insights for policymakers and buyer and supplier practitioners seeking to implement 
CBs in a public procurement context.  
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2. Literature review  
2.1 Differences between public and private sector procurement 
 
This study focuses on the public sector buying goods and services from the private sector. 
The European Union defines public procurement as “the process by which public authorities, 
such as government departments or local authorities, purchase work, goods or services from 
companies” (EUROPA, 2020). There are some key differences between the private and 
public sectors and they have different priorities and goals. Whilst firms sell goods or services 
in return for income, government and public sector organisations redistribute income, 
legislate and provide public services (Nijaki & Worrel, 2012). Firms mainly obtain funding 
from shareholders’ funds or from income derived from sales, whereas public sector 
organisations obtain funds from grants or taxation. Proportions of income from different 
sources vary across the public sector. For example, whilst local authorities and universities 
obtain the majority of their funding from government sources, registered social landlords 
obtain the largest share of their income from rent (Preuss, 2007; Universities UK, 2020). 
Whereas firms are accountable to shareholders, public sector organisations report to a wider 
range of stakeholders.  
 
 There are also key differences between private sector supply chain management and 
public sector procurement. Private sector organisations have more freedom to enter into 
contracts without undertaking lengthy procedures, often have long-term established 
relationships with preferred suppliers and can keep procurement contracts confidential. 
Public sector organisations are bound by legislation and rules meaning that contracting can be 
a lengthy process; it is more difficult to enter into long term partnerships and a higher level of 
transparency is required over contractual information. For example, UK public sector 
organisations have to comply with the Public Contract Regulations 2015 when procuring 
goods, services or works, and the provisions of the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 
apply to public procurement activities with varying effects across the UK. Furthermore, 
public sector organisations are increasingly required to use procurement as a tool for 
achieving wider social or economic objectives (McCrudden, 2004; Preuss, 2007). 
 
2.2 Public procurement policy as a tool for achieving socioeconomic objectives 
 
The literature concerned with SSCM suggests that government organisations may drive the 
adoption of corporate social responsibility practices (Carter & Jennings, 2004; Seuring & 
Muller, 2008; Walker & Preuss, 2008). It also suggests that the relative power of the buyer 
may be a key factor enabling them to compel suppliers to implement social SSCM measures 
(Preuss, 2009; Walker & Jones, 2011). The European Commission views socially responsible 
public procurement as covering a wide range of issues, including: 
 
“employment opportunities, decent work, compliance with social and labour 
rights, social inclusion (including persons with disabilities), equal opportunities, 
accessibility design for all, taking account of sustainability criteria, including 
ethical trade issues; and wider voluntary compliance with corporate social 
responsibility.”(p.7) (European Commission, 2010) 
 
 Public procurement comprises a significant proportion of expenditure, representing   
around 13% of UK Gross Domestic Product during 2017; and a third of all UK public 
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expenditure (HM Treasury, 2017). Governments use public procurement to address 
environmental, economic and social challenges or maximise socioeconomic benefits from 
public procurement (Macfarlane, 2014). Such policies may be viewed as a tool to drive public 
sector procurers and potential contractors to achieve economic or social objectives and 
influence suppliers’ behaviour (McCrudden, 2004; Preuss, 2009). Examples include 
promoting the procurement of locally produced goods or services, and targeting recruitment 
and training (TR&T) which is when employment opportunities are targeted at particular 
sectors of the community (Eadie et al., 2011; Erridge & Henningan, 2007; Loosemore, 2016).  
 
 The Welsh Government use legislation as a vehicle of commitment to ensure that public 
sector organisations consider social value when awarding contracts (Welsh Government, 
2014). Public sector organisations in Wales also have to comply with the Well-being of 
Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 (Welsh Government, 2019) and the Wales Procurement 
Policy Statement (Welsh Government, 2015). Such policies broaden public procurement 
considerations beyond consideration of costs (Loosemore, 2016), with implications for 
SSCM within the public sector and private sector supply chains associated with public sector 
contracts.  
2.3 CBs clauses as a form of sustainable procurement in the Welsh Government context 
 
The Welsh public sector is the largest buyer across the private and voluntary sectors in 
Wales, spending around £6 billion on procuring external goods, services and works during 
2015-16 (Audit Wales, 2017). This has led to public procurement being viewed as a tool for 
leveraging socio-economic value in Wales (Lynch, Uenk, Walker, & Schotanus, 2016). The 
Welsh Government has set out its policy requirement that CBs are obtained and reported on a 
range of public sector contracts (Welsh Government, 2015). This extends beyond the 
requirements of the Social Value Act, which only covers services procured by certain public 
sector bodies above a set financial threshold.  
  
 The earliest example of Welsh Government CBs guidance was published in 2008 (i2i, 
2008). This was followed in 2011 by the Welsh Government’s CBs guidance, revised in 2014 
(Welsh Government, 2014). Figure 1 illustrates the Welsh Government’s current expectations 
for achieving community benefits through procurement.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
 To measure CBs delivery, the Welsh Government developed and published an online CBs 
measurement tool for use by buyers and suppliers. Only two published reports examine issues 
related to delivering CB through public sector contracts from the perspective of public sector 
organisations in Scotland (Sutherland, McTier, Glass, & McGregor, 2015) and suppliers in 
Wales (Constructing Excellence in Wales, 2012). Therefore, this research builds on these 
reports and the wider academic literature concerned with SSCM and sustainable procurement 
to provide greater insights into issues related to CBs implementation. 
 
2.4 Studies of SSCM, sustainable procurement and social procurement 
 
A growing number of studies have explored SSCM in a commercial procurement context, 
and are excellently summarized in a variety of literature reviews (Dania, Xing, & Amer, 
2018; Miemczyk et al., 2012; Tachizawa & Wong, 2014; Touboulic & Walker, 2015). The 
focus of such studies tends to be on environmental and economic issues in a commercial 
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context, rather than focusing on the social aspects of SSCM. A number of literature reviews 
suggest that social SSCM research is growing (Quarshie, Salmi, & Leuschner, 2016; Zorzini 
et al., 2015). Studies have explored social SSCM issues in developing countries (Huq et al., 
2014), and across industries (Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010) in a commercial procurement 
context.  
  
 There is a growing collection of studies on sustainable procurement, looking at SSCM 
issues in a public procurement context (Brammer & Walker, 2011; Bratt, Hallstedt, Robèrt, 
Broman, & Oldmark, 2013; Lund-Thomsen & Costa, 2011; Preuss & Walker, 2011; Roman, 
2017; Uttam & Roos, 2015; Walker & Brammer, 2012). Finally, there are a few studies that 
have focused on understanding how public procurement can be used to support social 
initiatives (Erridge & Henningan, 2007; Hawkins, Gravier, & Powley, 2011; Meehan & 
Bryde, 2015; Snider, Halpern, Rendon, & Kidalov, 2013).  
 
 It is clear there is a relative lack of research on social issues in SSCM, and in public 
procurement settings. To date, there seem to be no studies specifically focusing on using 
public procurement to implement CBs. We seek to make a unique contribution to SSCM and 
sustainable procurement literature by addressing this gap. 
 
2.5 Theoretical perspectives 
 
2.5.1 Resource Dependency Theory 
 
A review of public procurement academic literature reported that less than a third of the 
articles contained any reference to theory (Flynn & Davies, 2014). Given the dearth of 
theoretical framing in public procurement research, our aim is to take an established theory to 
help us better understand the implementation of CBs. We propose that RDT (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) can provide a theoretical grounding for better understanding why 
organisations implement CBs, what factors affect it, and what the outcomes are. 
 
 Briefly, the key tenets of RDT are that “organisations are linked to their environments by 
federations, associations, customer-supplier relationships, competitive relationships, and a 
social-legal apparatus defining and controlling the nature and limits of these relationships” 
(p.2) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). RDT suggests that organisations must transact with other 
organisations that control access to critical resources and transactions may include the 
exchange of money, physical resources, information, expertise or social legitimacy (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). Furthermore, organisations require a steady flow of resource exchanges to 
operate. Sometimes stability may be valued higher than profits or organisational growth, 
hence trading partners may form alliances to reduce uncertainty and increase the stability of 
resource exchanges (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) suggest that 
“some concentration of power is inevitable to achieve collective outcomes” (p.52), and that 
the control over necessary resources provides other organisations with power over focal 
organisations.  
 
     RDT is not without its critics (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Nienhüser, 2008), 
which provide a useful counterpoint when considering our research context. An evaluation of 
RDT identified several criticisms of RDT (Nienhüser, 2008), such as that economic theories 
could explain many phenomena just as well as RDT (Donaldson, 1995). RDT has also been 
criticised for placing too much emphasis on material objective resources, rather than other 
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resource forms and how they are perceived (Clegg & Rura-Polley, 1998). A further criticism 
is that RDT does not identify which dependencies take precedence over others if several 
important dependencies exist, or acknowledge the multiplexity of dependencies and 
stakeholder importance, so combining RDT with stakeholder theory may offer opportunities 
(Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
     RDT is relevant to supply chain management, suggesting that organisations depend on 
other external organisations for essential resources within reciprocal relationships. Buyers 
and suppliers may develop closer relationships in order to influence the relative power 
balance (Cox & Ireland, 2002; Drees & Heugens, 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Buyers 
control resources on which suppliers are dependent, hence buying organisations are able to 
influence the behaviour of suppliers (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Touboulic, Chicksand, & 
Walker, 2014). Buyer and supplier organisations need to identify critical resources and who 
controls them (Mont & Leire, 2009). By pursuing sustainability initiatives in supply chain 
management, organisations may gain social legitimacy. In a meta-analysis of RDT studies, it 
was found that RDT can explain organizational actions that have societal acceptance rather 
than economic performance as an ulterior motive (Drees & Heugens, 2013). A study of law 
firms combined RDT and institutional theory, and found that resource scarcity drives, and 
social legitimacy enables, institutional change (Sherer & Lee, 2002).  
     RDT has been adopted to explore SSCM in private sector contexts. A power perspective 
based on RDT has been adopted to examine the implementation of sustainable practices 
within food supply chains (Touboulic et al., 2014), and RDT has been used to explain the 
adoption of sustainability practices by first-tier suppliers (Foerstl, Azadegan, Leppelt, & 
Hartmann, 2015). Dependencies have also been explored in a social SSCM context 
(Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010). RDT has been adopted to explore supply chain integration, 
innovation, and sustainability policies (Xu et al., 2019). RDT has also been adopted to help 
structure SSCM literature reviews (Dania et al., 2018; Gold, Seuring, & Beske, 2010; 
Tachizawa & Wong, 2014). However, RDT has rarely been applied in a public procurement 
context (Pazirandeh & Norrman, 2014). More specifically, we could not identify any studies 
that adopt RDT to look at social public procurement or CBs.  
     We propose that RDT can be applied to public sector procurement and supply chains and 
fills a gap since “organization theory has been, for the most part, content to be silent in 
discussions of public policy, particularly policies dealing with economic actors and markets” 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, p. xxv). It has also been suggested that the area where RDT most 
needs theoretical and empirical work is around political actions (Hillman et al., 2009), and 
‘[a]lthough scholars recognize the heterogeneity of dependence that accompanies government 
decision making, little theoretical development seeks to address this phenomena.’ (p.1420).  
     In our research context, public procurement and CBs are a major departure from the 
private sector SSCM literature where RDT is usually applied. We have shown that public 
procurement is very different from commercial procurement,and is bound by certain 
regulations and legislation. It has multiple stakeholders and dependencies, and CBs may be 
seen as a source of social legitimacy. We aim to explore RDT in this new context, to see what 
new insights can be offered for theory and practice.  
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2.5.2 Abductive theorizing: elaborating on RDT  
 
Having decided upon RDT to provide a guiding theoretical frame for our research, our next  
consideration is whether through our research we seek to engage in theory building, testing or 
elaboration (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). Our approach can be described as abductive theorizing, 
to allow for theory elaboration which is a ‘disciplined iteration between general theory and 
the empirical data’ (p.236) (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). An abductive approach allows us to 
connect with prior theory (Gehman et al., 2018) and infer the best explanation by reflecting 
between prior literature and data. 
 
     We did not seek to engage in inductive theorizing (grounded in the data) or deductive 
theorizing (grounded in prior knowledge) (Bansal, Smith, & Vaara, 2018; Gehman et al., 
2018), but chose the middle path of abductive theorizing. Some authors suggest that the 
grounded theory idea that qualitative researchers come into the research situation as a tabula 
rasa with no prior knowledge or theoretical ideas is illusory (Fawcett et al., 2014; Gehman et 
al., 2018). Conversely, applying theory rigidly may be restrictive and prevent novel insights 
(Gehman et al., 2018). We sought to apply prior knowledge whilst still being sensitive to the 
research context and allowing new themes to emerge. 
 
     We adopt RDT to guide the analytical iteration process between theory and data 
(Meinlschmidt, Schleper, & Foerstl, 2018). This process required us to ‘travel back and forth’ 
between our empirical findings and theory (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Abductive reasoning allows the general theory to be treated malleably in order to 
reconcile it with contextual idiosyncrasies (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). We aim to elaborate 
upon an existing theory, meaning that ‘existing theory in the area exists but gaps or 
oversights need to be filled’ (p.859) (Pratt, 2009). Considering where the gaps are, we have 
already observed that RDT has been adopted in SSCM, but not in a social public procurement 
context. Second, RDT research is lacking in public policy and government settings. Third, 
studies in SSCM often focus on the buying organisation, whereas we aim to adopt a dyadic 
approach to RDT by including both buyer and supplier perspectives on resources and power. 
Fourth, our public procurement context involves big resources in terms of spend, and 
potentially big power imbalances between the public and private sector organisations. We 
therefore seek to elaborate upon RDT, to see if our data suggests that there are specific 
constructs that need to be added to existing RDT concepts and processes. 
 
     Figures are a good way of capturing one’s chain of evidence in theory elaboration using 
case based qualitative data (Pratt, 2009; Yin, 2014). In Figure 2, we show the process of 
abductive theorizing, iteratively reflecting between theory and data. We capture the themes of 
RDT in our initial conceptual model, then present our empirical study. We then use RDT to 
guide our analysis whilst allowing new themes to emerge from the data, and then reflect 
between our findings and RDT theory and SSCM literature. Subsequently we revise our 
conceptual model.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
   
      Therefore, in Figure 3, we propose our initial conceptual model based on our review of 
RDT (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003), but applied in our social public procurement context. At 
the top of the model are the dyadic organisations public procurers and suppliers, connected in 
relationships and conducting transactions. The RDT elements include resource dependency 
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and balance of power. We shall return to this conceptual model in the discussion (Figure 4) to 
show how we have elaborated upon RDT in this context through our empirical investigations, 
following our abductive theorizing process. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
3. Methodology 
A case-based qualitative research design for data collection was applied in this research. This 
is particularly suitable for an abductive approach to theory elaboration (Ketokivi & Choi, 
2014) and allowed us to conduct variance-based case studies and see patterns across the data 
set (Bansal et al., 2018). We conducted purposive sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gehman et al., 
2018) to control for type of organisation, and compare different types of public sector 
organisations, as well as comparing the perspectives of buyers and suppliers. Methodological 
details are provided below, to enhance the transparency of our research (Fawcett et al., 2014), 
and help provide a chain of evidence (Pratt, 2009; Yin, 2014). 
     In terms of purposive sampling, we needed to identify a variety of case studies of potential 
public sector organisations and their suppliers who were experienced in CBs implementation. 
Desk research indicated that 1170 public sector contract notices published by UK contracting 
authorities in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU, 2020) between 1st January 
2012 and 31st December 2015 contained references to CBs, a number growing year on year. 
This search allowed us to identify three types of Welsh public sector organisations that were 
proactive in terms of CBs implementation: local authorities (LAs), registered social landlords 
(RSLs) and higher education institutes (HEs). We then identified specific organisations 
within South and West Wales for ease of data collection. Table 1 describes the main features 
of the public sector organisations participating in the study. The organisations differ in what 
sorts of public services they deliver, but they all have the Welsh Government as a 
key stakeholder.  
.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 Each organisation was approached by email initially and this was followed up with a 
phone call once the relevant internal key contacts had been identified. One of the researchers 
had previously been a public sector procurer for over 20 years and led the data collection 
process, and had an informed position in the field (Pratt, 2009). The key contacts were asked 
to identify individual participants involved in CBs implementation, including non-
procurement staff, and to propose key suppliers (S). The unit of analysis (Pratt, 2009) was the 
buyer-supplier dyad. Conducting semi-structured interviews and focus groups facilitated 
discussion of a range of complex issues with participants experienced in CBs 
implementation. Table 2 shows the spread of 72 participants across 29 organisations (12 
public sector; 17 suppliers). Participants ranged in job role from Procurement and Estates 
Directors, to Contracts Managers and Community Benefits Coordinators.   
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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 With regards to our data collection process, a semi-structured interview protocol was 
developed (see Appendix). This protocol built on a review of issues identified in the 
academic and grey literature and theoretical considerations. The interviews were semi-
structured and were modified depending on whether participants were from buyer or supplier 
organisations, and to allow interesting leads to be followed up. Interviews were recorded and 
assurances were given concerning confidentiality. The two focus group events occurred at 
meetings within the public procurement organisations. A researcher attended and observed, 
and then ran the focus groups after the meeting agenda was complete. The focus groups 
followed a similar question structure to the interview protocol, but the questions were open to 
the focus group for discussion. Interviews and focus groups were audio recorded and then 
transcribed. Individual interviewees were sent the transcriptions and asked to confirm their 
responses, but this was not practical for the focus groups.  
 
 In terms of data analysis, the transcripts were coded for each participant’s identity and 
organization, allowing comparison of responses within and between organisations (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). The transcripts were coded for the RDT themes of power and resources, 
for factors affecting CBs implementation, and relationship issues between buyers/suppliers. 
The interview data was analysed iteratively, and each interview transcript was scrutinized for 
data relating to RDT themes and for any novel themes emerging from the data. We continued 
to analyse each interview, until there was a saturation of themes (Bowen, 2008), and no 
further themes were suggested. Then the research team clustered, tabulated and analysed the 
data to compare similarities and differences between types of public sector organisations, and 
between buyers and suppliers. To our RDT themes, we therefore added (1) Welsh 
government as an additional powerful stakeholder, (2) inter and intra organisational issues (3) 
challenges, and (4) enablers.  
 
 The research design considered credibility, dependability, confirmability and 
transferability to ensure that qualitative research criteria were met (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; 
Halldorsson & Aastrup, 2003). Table 3 provides details of the steps taken to ensure that our 
approach to qualitative data collection and analysis was sound. We purposively sampled 
people with experience in implementing CBs in different roles. We sought to improve 
dependability by comparing buyers and suppliers, and different public sector settings, and 
sought feedback from buyers and suppliers on the findings. With regards to data collection, 
we followed an interview protocol, ensured anonymity and interviewees verified their 
transcripts. With data analysis, we were systematic in our coding, discussed coding issues 
during the process to clarify any discrepancies, and drew on themes from an established 
theory RDT, whilst seeking novel themes emerging from the data.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4. Findings 
This section summarises some key findings from our case studies. Supporting evidence is 
anonymised and the findings are reported below and discussed in section 5. 
 
4.1 Challenges 
 
A number of challenges emerged from the data when considering the factors affecting CBs 
implementation. 
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4.1.1 Tensions between political drivers and the perceived risk of legal challenge 
 
Our data showed that public sector organisations have to balance a range of external and 
organisational demands and comply with a range of legislative requirements when 
contracting for goods and services. Many of the public sector participants in this study 
reported that a perception of legal risk or challenge could inhibit CBs implementation, 
particularly in relation to actively encouraging the participation of local SMEs within the 
supply chain. For example, an LA participant explained that “It’s all about managing risk... 
The Welsh Government department’s advice goes against the agenda of trying to stimulate 
the local economy. It’s up to the organisation to make that call.” 
 
 A number of participants expressed concerns linked to the political uncertainty arising 
from the UK’s proposed exit from the EU. Additionally, continuing budget cuts due to 
austerity and the potential loss of EU funding were mentioned. In some cases unforeseen 
challenges had arisen due to changes to funding for schemes targeted at addressing social 
inequality, unemployment or training. For example, a supplier explained how austerity 
measures had impacted on programmes designed to help match potential applicants to 
training opportunities: “A previous job-match contract was 95% proven to get them into work 
but then the funding was inexplicably stopped.” 
 
 One type of CBs recommended by the Welsh Government is staff retention and training. 
However, employees or trainees cannot be retained unless suppliers have sufficient work to 
sustain staffing levels. Uncertainty over funding resources impacted on suppliers’ ability to 
retain staff or invest in them. As one supplier explained: “uncertainty will result in a 
reluctance to invest in training and development”. 
 
 The Welsh Government is responsible for collecting the apprenticeship levy and deciding 
how the funds should be used; but at the time of the study one supplier said the future 
strategy was unclear; “As far as we understand it, Welsh Government is going to collect the 
[apprenticeship levy] and then decide what they’re going to do with it. There is no guarantee 
that all of that levy goes back into training”. Participants suggested that CBs implementation 
would be assisted by greater legal and political certainty and a higher level of consistency 
from Welsh Government.  
4.1.2 Tensions between collaborative procurement and other goals 
 
The interviewees revealed some of the tensions that arise when organisations seek to balance 
obtaining value for money through collaborative procurement, and pursuing other goals such 
as promoting the inclusion of SMEs or third sector organisations within supply chains. Public 
bodies may seek to maximise the power of procurement expenditure by aggregating 
contracts, collaboratively procuring goods and services or participating in purchasing 
consortia. Many public sector participants highlighted possible conflicts between supporting 
the Welsh Government’s collaborative procurement initiatives and developing SME 
involvement through their supply chain. As one RSL participant explained: “Changes to 
contracting, for example to create larger contracts more amenable to TR&T, can result in 
excluding SMEs.” 
 
 The Welsh Government established the National Procurement Service to tender 
collaborative framework agreements or contracts for commonly purchased commodities and 
services (National Procurement Service, 2020). Some public sector participants viewed the 
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collaborative procurement and framework agreement activities promoted by the National 
Procurement Service as hindering their ability to award contracts to local suppliers, or more 
generally conflicting with other organisational goals. For example, one LA participant said: 
“The National Procurement Service can be a hindrance where the organisation is trying to 
keep spend as local as possible.” 
 
 Some public sector organisations and first tier suppliers had encountered difficulty 
including local SMEs in their supply chains, particularly for larger value contracts or goods 
and services that were not available through local suppliers.  Encouraging smaller supplies to 
jointly or collaboratively bid for contracts has been suggested as a method of overcoming the 
capacity issues that can disadvantage them in the bidding process (Welsh Government, 2014). 
However one LA had encountered resistance from suppliers to this approach: “They don’t 
want to work together… the reluctance is huge”. The Welsh Government has proposed two 
other methods of countering the impact of larger contracts/framework agreements. Public 
sector organisations can require main contractors to advertise subcontracts on the Welsh 
Government’s ‘Sell2Wales’ online marketplace under the contracts notification section 
(Sell2Wales, 2020), or public sector organisations/main contractors may host face-to-face 
“Meet the Buyer” events (Welsh Government, 2014).  
 
 However, ensuring opportunities to participate through advertising subcontracts was not 
necessarily deemed effective. One potential unforeseen consequence was the conflict 
between this requirement and the established supply chains of main contractors. As one large 
supplier explained: “The organisation has a supply chain family which consists of a 
preferred list of contractors: approved, recommended and strategic… Another aim of this 
approach is to build trust and faith, so as faith builds, retention monies are released earlier… 
We feel that we’ve got a pretty good supply chain, and we look after them and they look after 
us.” 
4.1.3 Trade-offs between costs and perceived CBs benefits 
 
Budget cuts resulting from austerity can result in cost being prioritised above other 
considerations, or limit the focus of CBs to certain contracts. As highlighted by an LA 
participant: “…the greater good from CBs is the way to go but when the budgets are being 
reduced … directors complain they could be getting a better price.” Most public sector 
participants viewed CBs as being implemented in a cost-neutral manner, or suggested that 
obtaining value for money could be traded-off against any additional costs.  
 
 Conversely, the majority of suppliers claimed that costs were incurred; and additional 
costs related to CBs implementation or monitoring were either hidden, since the client did not 
wish them to be disclosed or passed down the supply chain. As one supplier explained: “CBs 
do have a cost attached, but this is not reflected in the tender price as they are categorised as 
‘non-recoverables’ so represent a loss... Alternatively the costs will get negotiated further 
down with the subcontractor packages.” 
 
 The study indicated that CBs were not always included in the award criteria for contracts, 
and even when they were, price or other criteria were ranked more highly. The findings also 
suggest that public sector organizations prefer to view CBs implementation as cost-neutral, 
and suppliers perpetuate this view by not transparently disclosing the costs associated with 
implementation.  
12 
 
4.1.4 Unanticipated consequences of types of CBs 
 
Targeted recruitment and training (TR&T) emerged in this study as the most common form 
of CBs sought by the participating public sector organisations. Such initiatives could be 
targeted at persons not in employment, education or training, or other groups such as service 
veterans. The study suggests that particular tensions arise when public sector organisations 
prioritise TR&T over other forms of CBs. Many participants had encountered a lack of 
potential applicants in certain categories, or difficulty finding agencies that could help 
identify suitable candidates. As one supplier said: “It can be difficult to appoint NEETs 
[persons not in employment, education or training] … or others that fall outside the 
traditional training route, identifying them, overcoming all the health and safety issues, 
trying to identify suitable programmes for homeless”.  
     TR&T was a challenge for suppliers that had not previously worked in a region since they 
did not have established links with organisations that could facilitate access to target groups. 
Some participants suggested that such problems can be mitigated if organisations could liaise 
with other organisations that can facilitate recruitment or training, such as Workways, 
Careers Wales, the Construction Industry Training Board or Build UK. One supplier 
suggested tying TR&T delivery into the client’s existing schemes or partnerships: “[we] will 
look at what partnerships the client has, any particular requirements or local priorities, 
trying to find something that will slipstream into any existing programmes that they may have 
because it’s so much easier to cut to the chase if there’s already a skills and partnership 
agreement”.  
 Although the Welsh Government’s CBs guidance encourages the retention and training of 
existing employees, the promotion of TR&T appears to mitigate against this. A supplier 
explained: “The other issue is with the TR&T and the way it’s written and set out at the 
moment, it’s almost encouraging you to employ people for a project and then let them go at 
the end so that you can employ new people for a different project just so they can be 
‘counted’ against a target… more public sector clients need to understand this”. Participants 
highlighted the need for improved guidance to help realise CBs from a broader range of 
contracts. 
 
 The move towards collaborative procurement framework agreements rather than longer-
term contracts results in less certainty for suppliers that they will win contracts, impacting on 
suppliers’ ability to deliver TR&T. Hence a lack of contract certainty was raised by many 
suppliers as impacting on TR&T delivery, resulting in associated costs and difficulty 
ensuring apprentices can gain the necessary experience to progress in construction. A 
supplier told us  that: “Some frameworks are speculative, and procurement consortium led... 
Funding uncertainty may have resulted in lots of smaller contracts, not providing the 
certainty [workflow] needed for many CBs, eg TR&T”.  
 
 Suppliers suggested that TR&T would be more easily accommodated if they had greater 
contract certainty, allowing suppliers to ensure that apprentices could gain the necessary 
experience to obtain qualifications.  Other possible solutions include increasing the 
availability and use of shared-apprenticeship schemes or funding for traditional 
apprenticeship schemes. Alternatively, clients could recognise that suppliers may not be able 
to offer TR&T and be more flexible to consider alternative types of CBs, potentially enabling 
more SMEs to provide CBs. 
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4.2 Resources 
Wales is a member state of the UK and Welsh Government is a devolved Government for 
Wales responsible for making policies and laws in certain areas such as health and education 
according to powers delegated by the UK Government in the Government of Wales Act 2006 
(UK Government, 2006). Wales receives an annual budget allocation from the UK 
Government (Welsh Government, 2020). Some funding is channelled to other Welsh public 
sector organisations which in turn use a significant proportion of funding to procure goods, 
works and services. Welsh Government provides resources and exerts influence on public 
procurers. For example, an LA participant highlighted the effectiveness of the Welsh 
Government’s policy as being clearly linked to resource allocation: “Part of the funding 
conditions for Welsh Government monies is a requirement to complete the CB management 
tool”. 
 
 Welsh government hold access to valuable resources, which they leverage to ensure that 
public sector clients and main contractors drive CBs implementation through Welsh supply 
chains. Ensuring sufficient resources for implementation is essential for maximising CBs 
delivery. An LA participant explained the influence that key individuals can have on CBs 
delivery or monitoring: “This problem is not helped when key people leave the organisation, 
so you have to start again trying to get them to appreciate such problems”. Conversely, 
ensuring adequate resources and managerial support alongside guidance and training can 
enable more effective CBs implementation.  
 
4.3 Power 
 
Welsh Government has legal power in Wales and drives CBs policy. Welsh Government 
utilises its power to set policy to require that public sector organisations seek CBs when 
procuring goods, works and services. The power of the Welsh Government to enforce this 
policy was a clear driver emerging from the study. As one RSL participant explained: “we 
are enforced to do it, with the Welsh Government driving us”. The Welsh Government can 
also influence suppliers that wish to contract with it; and suppliers selling a larger proportion 
of goods to a government or other public sector organisations may be more willing to comply 
with government requests.  
 
      Whilst buyers and sellers are interdependent, the relation may be asymmetric with 
differing balance of power related to the availability of scarce resources, and levels of 
interdependency varying over time due to market conditions. The scarcer the resource, the 
higher the level of dependency by one party on another. Many suppliers indicated that client 
requirements and evidence of their capability to deliver CBs were important drivers for CBs 
implementation, since “being able to evidence CSR and CBs is important for winning bids.” 
 
 Influential individuals also play their part. Many participants suggested that involving key 
internal or external participants could enable more effective CBs implementation. As one 
RSL participant explained: “Contractors are very much viewed as partners, working together 
to achieve outcomes, viewing the relationships as a partnership rather than a supply chain”. 
A supplier also highlighted the importance of involving others holding knowledge or power 
within their organisation: “As one person, there’s no way I am going to deliver everything… 
without the co-operation of other people, there’s no way you could do it by yourself.” 
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 Buying organisations, including large contractors, influence supplier behaviour and 
depend on other organisations to successfully deliver CBs. The Welsh Government controls 
financial resources on which public sector organisations and their suppliers depend; in turn 
main contractors hold resources on which subcontractors depend. Therefore, those who hold 
resources influence the behavior of other organisations and individuals by driving CBs 
implementation, delivery and reporting. Public sector organisations and suppliers implement 
CBs to demonstrate legitimacy and trustworthiness, for example to funders or clients.  
 
4.4 Cross-case comparisons 
 
In this section we make cross-case comparisons to compare across different public sector 
settings, then contrast buyer-supplier perspectives. 
 
4.4.1 Comparing across public sector buying organisations 
 
Some differences emerged in the responses of participants within different types of public 
sector organisation. Several RSL participants did not view their organisations as part of the 
public sector, considering them more akin to third sector organisations, with some viewing 
the activities of the National Procurement Service as being skewed towards LA requirements. 
RSLs are often based on a community mutual business model, placing the local community is 
at the heart of all the organisation’s activities, and resulting in an awareness of a need to 
benefit their tenants or wider community. As one RSL participant said: “The only customers 
we have are our tenants”. 
 
 Providing social housing contributes to the social and economic well-being of the area in 
which it takes place. This may provide the opportunity to include a wide range of CBs in 
contracts to address social exclusion, and most RSLs operate a community fund to which 
suppliers can contribute, used to benefit tenants. There was a noticeable difference in the way 
supply chain relationships were viewed and managed, with RSL participants frequently 
referring to suppliers as ‘partners’ and collaborating more closely with them to ensure CBs 
delivery. RSLs in this study proposed the inclusion of a higher number of SMEs as first tier 
contractors than the other public organisations, and accessed dedicated staffing resources to 
support CBs implementation.  
 
 HE institutions generally dealt with national contractors, reflecting the more specialist 
nature of many types of contract linked to research activities and lower prevalence of 
contracts suitable for certain CBs types: “To include CBs like TR&T requires large contracts, 
which are not so prevalent in this sector as, say, in local authorities”. Proportionally more 
HE participants were concerned about legal barriers and potential future legislation than those 
in other sectors. They were more sceptical about achieving cost-neutrality. 
 
 LA participants were more concerned about political or legislative risks which impacted 
on organisational strategy. Local elections are held every four years, potentially resulting in 
changes in a LA’s strategic focus and at the time of the interviews there was discussion of 
local authority reorganisation and boundary changes. “The procurement strategy is out of 
date but revision has consciously been put on hold pending changes to legislation and the 
outcome of discussions on local authority restructuring across Wales… there’s an inevitable 
need to tie in with the local government election timetable”.  Almost all the LA participants 
were concerned about potentially conflicting objectives, reflecting the wide range of services 
they have to provide to a more diverse range of clients in a period of austerity. As one LA 
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participant said: “elected Members and Senior Officers have finite resources and have to put 
them where they think they will best fulfil their statutory requirements.” 
   
4.4.2 Comparing buyer – supplier perspectives 
 
There were some similarities between the challenges faced by suppliers and buyers seeking to 
implement CBs. For example, both types of participants reported issues related to identifying 
agencies that could assist with TR&T implementation. Participants in both groups suggested 
that greater flexibility would facilitate CBs implementation. However, some important 
differences in the perceptions of public sector buyers and their suppliers emerged. There were 
conflicting views on the costs associated with CBs implementation, with buyers preferring to 
view CBs implementation as cost-neutral and suppliers, particularly SMEs, concerned about 
costs related to CBs implementation.  
 
 A number of issues were mentioned by suppliers but recognised by few public sector 
organisations. The increased use of framework agreements has resulted in consequences for 
suppliers and impacted on SME and third sector suppliers, leading to contract uncertainty and 
limiting their ability to offer TR&T, or retain and train existing employees. Suppliers said 
that public sector clients didn’t understand the implications and possible unanticipated 
consequences of their decisions.  
 
 As one supplier explained: “capital works projects are very different to housing projects 
in terms of the timing of staff resources, so the CBs guidance for RSLs doesn’t really 
translate well to capital works projects. Hence requirements such as 52 training weeks per 
annum per £1M do not translate as well to capital works where a trade may only be on-site 
for 3 months”. Suppliers called for higher levels of liaison with public sector clients to help 
them overcome challenges; better guidance and training for clients; greater consistency in the 
approach to delivering CBs; higher levels of contract certainty; and earlier involvement. For 
example one supplier suggested that: “Before bids are written, they could liaise a bit more 
closely with the market... Closer working relationships can be developed with clients. This 
includes tailoring content to reflect local circumstances.” 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In the next sections we discuss our findings and reflect back on theory and literature. We 
revisit our model of RDT, and formulate key propositions which may have resonance for 
broader SSCM and sustainable procurement research.  
 
5.1 Factors influencing CBs implementation 
 
The focus in this article has been to address the research question ‘What are the factors 
influencing the implementation of CBs in public procurement?’. Our study highlights some of 
the enablers and challenges influencing CBs implementation, which are discussed below. 
 
5.1.1 Enablers of CBs implementation 
 
A number of enablers of CBs implementation emerged from the interviews with buyers and 
suppliers, which are focused at different points in the supply chain. Welsh Government could 
clarify their policy guidance, clear up any misconceptions about whether TR&T is to be 
prioritised, and offer guidance on how to balance trade-offs between different policy 
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objectives such as value for money, collaborative procurement and supporting socioeconomic 
objectives.  
 
 Public sector buyers could ensure greater coordination among agencies supporting 
employment or training, communicate early with suppliers and involve all parties, and offer 
greater contract commitment, which would particularly help SMEs. It helps if buyers are 
consistent, develop work pipelines with suppliers, have flexible and realistic targets, and a 
more strategic view. Buyers could also acknowledge the challenges and costs faced by 
suppliers, and be aware of their interdependence with suppliers in achieving CBs goals.  
 
 Suppliers can offer sub-contractors supplier development programmes on CBs, and be 
more transparent, communicate early and share expertise with buyers. In an investigation of 
electric vehicle supply chains from an RDT perspective, it was found that early involvement 
and relationship-specific investments by the supplier can increase interdependency (Kalaitzi, 
Matopoulos, & Clegg, 2019).  
 
 
With respect to RDT, it appears that social legitimacy is in play, with both buyers and 
suppliers suggesting that CBs is something they can agree upon as a shared goal. Financial 
resources are not the only resources at play; increasing communication between buyers and 
suppliers improves the flow of information resources, and will improve commitment and 
mitigate risks. It also is likely to lessen power imbalances that can occur if one organisation 
withholds information from another (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This also extends to the 
powerful stakeholder of the Welsh government, as greater clarity and communication of CBs 
policy guidance will ensure a more informed approach to CBs implementation amongst 
buyers and suppliers.  
 
Proposition 1a: Greater coordination and communication among buyers and suppliers 
will enable CBs implementation  
 
Proposition 1b: Buyers and suppliers may gain social legitimacy from CBs 
implementation 
 
 
5.1.2 Challenges of CBs implementation 
Our study also sought to explore the challenges of CBs implementation. We found evidence 
of tensions and unanticipated consequences that arise when implementing CBs. The 
implementation of CBs occurs in a context of conflicting policy agendas. Welsh public sector 
organisations have to manage competing policy goals when implementing CBs, along with 
value for money and collaborative procurement. This need to meet a wide range of objectives 
may result in trade-offs between cost, quality and wider social benefits (Lund-Thomsen & 
Costa, 2011; Meehan & Bryde, 2014). Public sector organisations struggle with budget cuts 
and a requirement to demonstrate short-term savings in a period of austerity (Lynch et al., 
2016; Sutherland et al., 2015). Hence organisations are likely to give economic objectives a 
higher priority than other competing objectives (Eadie et al., 2011; Mont & Leire, 2009; 
Walker & Phillips, 2009). 
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     With regards to value for money, there were clear tensions between buyer and supplier 
perspectives on the issue of cost. Although public sector participants preferred to view CBs 
implementation as cost-neutral, the cost of implementation emerged as a major concern for 
suppliers, particularly for SMEs with few resources. Suppliers made it clear that costs had to 
be passed to clients or absorbed, so CBs are not generally provided unless required by clients. 
Suppliers generally bear the cost of implementing sustainable practices and it is important 
that the benefits outweigh the cost (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012).  
 
     Collaborative procurement policy can also have unintended consequences for CBs. When 
public sector organisations join together to achieve economies of scale through collaborative 
procurement, larger suppliers with more resources may be favoured over SMEs to mitigate 
risks. Third sector organisations and SMEs often face barriers when seeking to tender for 
public sector contracts (Loosemore, 2016; Preuss & Walker, 2011). Collaborative 
procurement frameworks tend to be shorter fixed term contracts, and do not offer the scope 
for incorporating CBs that long-term contracts offer. It is harder for SMEs to provide TR&T 
and retain and train existing staff without contract commitment. “Industry voids”, where 
insufficient skills or capacity are available regionally or within a specific sector (Lynch et al., 
2016) may result in difficulties in including local suppliers.  
 
     There are also unintended consequences around which aspects of CBs are prioritised. 
Early CBs policy guidance from the Welsh Government on housing construction emphasized 
Targeted Recruitment and Training (TR&T) (Constructing Excellence in Wales, 2012). This 
led to suppliers perceiving TR&T as a priority for the Welsh Government. This supplier 
perception may negatively impact on other forms of CBs, which were less prevalent in this 
study. By targeting groups such as long-term unemployed or young people, opportunities are 
reduced for individuals who do not fall within that priority group (Macfarlane, 2014). 
Successful TR&T implementation could be achieved by increasing resources to identify 
suitable candidates, and by buyers loosening the restrictions on targeting specific groups. 
 
     It is apparent that there are numerous challenges to CBs implementation. When we 
critically evaluate these challenges and reflect on RDT, we find that challenges occur at 
different levels. Some are manifested at the Welsh Government policy level where there are 
conflicting objectives, and CBs guidance could be clearer. Some challenges occur at the 
buyer level, such as not providing contract certainty, and a lack of acknowledgement that 
CBs are not cost neutral. These sorts of ‘inconsiderate’ buyer behaviours make life difficult 
for suppliers, and may emerge from buyers assuming that they hold the balance of power, 
with suppliers dependent on them for contracts. There needs to be a greater acceptance that 
buyers and suppliers are interdependent, and that CBs are less likely to be successfully 
implemented unless they work together (Touboulic et al., 2014).  
Proposition 2a: Buyers may be unaware that CBs implementation is not cost neutral for 
suppliers  
Proposition 2b: Collaborative procurement that seeks economies of scale may have the 
unanticipated effect of impeding CBs implementation and buying from SMEs  
Proposition 2c: It may be unintended by buyers, but suppliers may perceive one aspect of 
CBs as a priority over others  
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5.1.3 Divergence in buyer and supplier views of implementing CBs 
 
In the above sections we have discussed the enablers and challenges to CBs implementation. 
Interestingly, these factors were consistently identified by the suppliers but not the buyers 
interviewed in the study. CBs implementation incurs costs which are not always 
acknowledged by the buyer, but which are apparent to suppliers, and particularly felt by 
SMEs. Buyers seem less aware of some of the unintended consequences of their actions, such 
as how collaborative procurement or shorter contracts might hinder CBs implementation. In 
addition to highlighting such divergent views and challenges, these findings add weight to the 
value of exploring both buyer and supplier perspectives in studies concerned with SSCM 
(Hall, 2000; Miemczyk et al., 2012; Murfield & Tate, 2017) or sustainable procurement 
implementation. 
 
Proposition 3a: Buyer and supplier perspectives on CB implementation are likely to be 
divergent 
 
Proposition 3b: Buyers may underestimate how their actions can impede CBs 
implementation 
 
 
5.2 Theoretical implications 
 
Having considered some of the factors affecting CBs implementation, we now seek to revisit 
our conceptual model based on RDT in a public procurement context, and consider the 
theoretical implications of the study.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
     In Table 4 we draw together our findings and relate them to the various elements of RDT. 
We add some constructs to the central tenets of RDT, which have emerged from our 
travelling back and forth between the theory and data. We also adopted an iterative process to 
check the themes emerging from our empirical analysis for support in the SSCM and 
sustainable procurement literature. On the left of Table 4, are the original RDT elements of 
resources and power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). We also 
differentiated between inter- and intra-organisational issues, as the analysis revealed that 
resources and power transcend organisational boundaries. Next to these we add challenges as 
discussed in the section above, as it was apparent that there were conflicts, trade-offs and 
unintended consequences associated with implementing CBs. On the right of Table 4, we 
offer enablers of CBs implementation, and ways to ameliorate schisms between buyers and 
suppliers. The various elements of Table 4 are discussed below.  
 
5.2.1 Resources 
The resource dependency perspective helped to illuminate the flow of resources in a CBs 
context. We found that organizations hold valuable resources that can influence the actions of 
other organizations. How does this process of control over resources happen in our context? 
The Welsh Government procurement expenditure is a valuable resource and can be used to 
benefit the Welsh economy and community. The Welsh Government distributes public 
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funding to public sector organisations, who procure works, goods and services. The Welsh 
Government provides a policy imperative for CBs implementation, which public sector 
buyers need to adhere to, and this can often be in conflict with other policies such as 
collaborative procurement and value for money.  
     If we look at the buyer-supplier dyad, public sector buyers control who receives contracts, 
and work with suppliers to achieve successful CBs implementation. Suppliers and 
subcontractors compete to obtain a share of this resource by tendering for public sector 
contracts. Suppliers are often in a situation where they will offer CBs because their clients 
require it, and it is a route to gaining valuable resources and potential repeat business. We 
offer the following proposition:  
Proposition 4: Buyers and suppliers depend on one another for resources to implement 
CBs 
 
5.2.2 Power 
 
In terms of the balance of power over resources, the Welsh Government seeks to influence 
the supply market, increasing the involvement of SMEs within supply chains, building skill 
levels in Wales, and reducing dependence on suppliers outside Wales. Legislation and 
regulations can mediate and influence market forces (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The Welsh 
Government is a legislator and the most powerful stakeholder in our research setting, and 
actively uses regulatory power in addition to financial resources to exert power over public 
organizations and suppliers. Public procurement is bound by certain rules which do not occur 
in commercial procurement settings. For example, legislation requires that buyers are 
transparent, ensure open competition and a level playing field in the procurement process, 
which can restrict the development of longer-term relationships with suppliers. RDT 
emphasizes power derived from resource-related dependence, but our context reveals the 
importance of regulatory power wielded by the Welsh Government as well. This is an 
elaboration of RDT that arises in a public procurement rather than commercial context, where 
a commercial buyer and supplier may not be exposed to such additional pressures. However, 
there may be other important external stakeholders that influence the buyer-supplier dyads in 
a commercial setting, which would be worthy of further exploration (Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
     We have seen that this regulatory power concerns competing procurement objectives, such 
as value for money and collaborative procurement, which may run counter to CBs 
implementation, leaving buyers faced with making trade-offs between conflicting policy 
agendas. The Welsh Government may also wield regulatory power but not experience the 
consequences. The Welsh Government is a step removed from CBs implementation; 
“political decision makers most often do not directly experience the consequences of their 
actions” (p. 191) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). We found that public sector organisations and 
their suppliers, rather than the Welsh Government, are affected by the unanticipated 
consequences related to implementing CBs policy and have to deal with conflicting priorities, 
determining which trade-offs to make to ensure CBs compliance. For example, buyers are 
tasked by the Welsh Government with achieving value for money, CBs implementation and 
encouraging SMEs into the market. SMEs may not have the resources to respond to CBs 
criteria, and may not offer the economies of scale achieved through collaborative 
procurement from larger suppliers. SMEs may therefore be deterred from bidding for future 
contracts, and so the buyers are left with less choice and a more restricted supply market. 
Some priorities may be achieved at the expense of others. It is the Welsh Government that 
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sets the policies, but the buyers and suppliers that are directly affected. This could eventually 
lead to a lack of support for policies such as CBs within the public procurement and supplier 
communities. 
 
In addition, we found a degree of interdependence between buyers and suppliers, relying on 
each other to achieve desired outcomes (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Handfield, 1993). The 
extent to which buyers and suppliers are dependent upon each other was found to have 
limited influence on the implementation of supplier socially responsible practices in a 
commercial context (Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010). Conversely, another study found that even 
though a buyer has some financial power over a supplier, it recognizes that it is dependent on 
the supplier to ensure SSCM implementation, so it does not try to act in a dominant way 
towards the supplier (Touboulic et al., 2014). Similarly, in our public sector context, buyers 
and suppliers can be considered interdependent, and found implementing CBs was something 
that they agreed was a positive initiative. Implementing CBs provides buyers and suppliers 
with social legitimacy, and may lead to further funding or contracts (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Attracting further resources may become self-fulfilling for better-
resourced larger suppliers who are known to buyers, and have greater capacity to deliver and 
report CBs. This can lead to resource constrained SMEs being further squeezed out of the 
market. This leads to the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 5a: Powerful external stakeholders outside the buyer-supplier dyad 
control resources that influence CBs implementation 
 
Proposition 5b: Powerful government stakeholders wield both financial and 
regulatory power 
 
Proposition 5c: SMEs lack power and resources which may lead to less success in 
winning contracts 
 
5.2.3 Intra and inter organisational issues 
 
In terms of inter-organisational issues, we have seen that the buyer and supplier views of 
implementing CBs are divergent. The power of a department, team or induvial to influence 
actions may be linked to the amount of resources they control (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). 
The early involvement of key organisations and individuals emerged as a key facilitator of 
successful CBs implementation. Identifying who are the key players controlling resources 
and gaining managerial support was found to be important. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: Key internal and external stakeholders may have power and control over 
resources which can influence CBs implementation  
 
5.3 Revisiting our conceptual model 
 
Having discussed the themes emerging from iterative reflection between theory and data in 
Table 4, we now revisit our original conceptual model in Figure 4, to add some flesh to its 
bones. We elaborate upon our RDT conceptual model in four ways, showing the new 
additions in grey in figure 4. These constructs are not articulated in the original RDT, and our 
process of theory elaboration has served to illuminate resource dependency issues in a public 
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procurement context, and may have a resonance for research exploring other situations of 
buyer-supplier interdependencies. 
In the top left of the model, we have included an influential stakeholder the ‘Welsh 
Government’ as one of the actors influencing the buyer-supplier dyad. We also show its 
power and resources in grey. Because government controls the flow of funds and ha 
regulatory power, it has the greater influence, whereas buyers and suppliers are more 
interdependent. Therefore, we show the power scales as tipped in the Welsh Government’s 
favour, whereas the power scales between buyers and suppliers are level to show 
interdependency. To the right of the model, we have added an element that says ‘Inter and 
intra organisational issues’. Buyers and suppliers have different views of CBs 
implementation, as do buyers across public sector organisations, such as RSLs being more 
likely to see suppliers as ‘partners’. In addition, key individuals can strongly influence CBs 
implementation. Towards the bottom of the model, we have captured the ‘challenges’ 
identified in our study, as power imbalances and competition for resources can lead to a 
number of tensions, trade-offs, and unintended consequences. Finally, we identified a number 
of ‘enablers’ of resource flow for CBs implementation. We show the enablers and challenges 
from the perspective of the different actors in public procurement, for the Welsh 
Government, public procurers, suppliers, and in the buyer-supplier dyad. The elaborated RDT 
conceptual model looks static, but we are aware that the elements are inter-related and 
dynamic, and may shift. For example, dependencies may change with new public 
procurement policy launches, or in markets where there are fewer suppliers so that the 
balance of power shifts. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
5.4 Practical implications 
 
This study suggests that the Welsh Government’s policy of CBs has successfully driven 
implementation by public sector organisations and within their supply chains. Although the 
study found support among public sector organisations and suppliers, some participants 
criticised how it had been communicated through guidance and training. Several suppliers 
expressed concerns that public sector clients did not understand the implications for suppliers 
or possible unintended consequences of their decisions when implementing CBs. Politicians 
and public sector organisations need to acknowledge that CBs delivery is rarely cost-neutral. 
The costs to suppliers could be offset through more consistent funding to support 
employment and training and providing higher levels of contract certainty. Adopting such 
measures could provide an incentive for SMEs and third sector organisations to bid for public 
sector contracts by decreasing the costs associated with providing CBs. 
 
     A number of enablers have been identified in Table 4, which will provide some helpful 
suggestions for policy makers and buyer and supplier practitioners. This study highlighted the 
need for higher levels of communication, liaison and flexibility between suppliers, clients, 
and public sector organisations. This is especially important in the pre-market engagement 
and early contract phases of projects. The Welsh Government policy makers need to provide 
clearer guidance about competing procurement objectives. The Welsh government and public 
sector buyers need to be aware that regulatory power and buyer dominance may have a 
counter effect on CBs implementation. 
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5.5 Limitations and recommendations for further research 
 
In our conceptual model in figure 4, we have elaborated upon the main elements of RDT, and 
show the complex flow of resources, power and tensions between organisations in a public 
procurement context. It would be useful for future research to explore this model in more 
detail and in different public sector contexts, comparing the perspectives of the different 
buyer and supplier actors, and exploring how central government wields regulatory and 
financial power, and its affect upon sustainability initiatives. We have also offered up a 
number of propositions from our study, and future research could further test them.  
 
 Our study focused on CBs implementation in Wales. We sought to make comparisons 
across public sector organisations. Several studies have focused on implementing social 
procurement initiatives in a single type of public sector organisation such as local authorities 
(Lynch et al., 2016; Preuss, 2009) or social landlords (Meehan & Bryde, 2014). Including 
three types of public sector organisation in this study aimed at improving the generalisability 
of the findings in a public procurement context. To extend this further, future research could 
develop a survey to seek the views of buyers and suppliers across different public sector and 
national contexts.  
 
 Our study sought views from both buyers and suppliers in dyadic relationships. Our 
findings suggest that buyers are less aware or less concerned about the challenges that 
suppliers face in implementing CBs. It has been observed that the majority of previous 
studies into SSCM implementation have solely considered a buyer perspective (Miemczyk et 
al., 2012). By adopting a dyadic approach, this study lifts the lid on implementing CBs from 
both the buyer and supplier perspectives, and highlights the divergence of views. We would 
recommend that a dyadic approach is worthy of pursuit in SSCM research, public 
procurement research, and CBs research in particular, otherwise one only gets a buyer’s eye 
view on the procurement process.  
 
     A further option for future research is to adopt RDT in different contexts. For example, 
one could consider different forms of socioeconomic procurement goals beyond CBs 
implementation, both in a public procurement and a private SSCM context. This will allow 
further understanding of what helps and hinders resource dependency and how it influences 
SSCM initiative implementation (Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010; Foerstl et al., 2015; Touboulic 
et al., 2014). The distinction between intra and inter-organisational issues from an RDT 
perspective would also be a rich vein to explore, potentially integrating RDT with  
stakeholder theory (Hillman et al., 2009), to explore the influential stakeholders that facilitate 
sustainability initiatives. Future research could also consider different resource and power 
contexts, such as markets where there are fewer suppliers, so the buyer’s power to influence 
CBs implementation may be reduced.  
 
 Implementing socioeconomic policy goals though public procurement is an engaging and 
fruitful area for research and practice that seeks to pursue sustainable development goals and 
redress socioeconomic imbalances in society. Public procurement involves large amounts of 
money and is around £6 billion or 12% of Gross Domestic Product in Wales (Audit Wales, 
2017), so there is a real opportunity to influence supply markets, and make significant 
changes that will be felt by local communities and small businesses, particularly important in 
an area of economic deprivation and high unemployment such as Wales. This study found 
widespread support amongst buyers and suppliers for implementing CBs in public sector 
contracts, but that there were significant challenges, conflicting agendas and unintended 
23 
 
consequences in the implementation process. By unpicking some of these difficulties, and 
focusing on the enablers, it may be possible to facilitate greater societal changes through 
public procurement.  
Acknowledgements  
The authors would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council (ref 1369142), 
for funding this research.  
 
References 
 
 
Audit Wales. (2017). Public Procurement in Wales. Retrieved from 
https://www.audit.wales/system/files/publications/Public-Procurement-in-Wales-
2017-English_0.pdf  
Awaysheh, A., & Klassen, R. D. (2010). The impact of supply chain structure on the use of 
supplier socially responsible practices. International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, 30(12), 1246-1268. doi:10.1108/01443571011094253 
Bansal, P., Smith, W. K., & Vaara, E. (2018). New ways of seeing through qualitative 
research. Academy of Management Journal, 61(4), 1189-1195. 
doi:10.5465/amj.2018.4004 
Baum, J. A. C., & Oliver, C. (1991). Institutional linkages and organizational mortality. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 187-218.  
Bernal, R., San-Jose, L., & Luis Retolaza, J. (2019). Improvement actions for a more social 
and sustainable public procurement: A delphi analysis. Sustainability, 11(15), 4069.  
Bowen, G. (2008). Naturalistic inquiry and the saturation concept: a research note. 
Qualitative Research, 8(1), 137-152.  
Brammer, S., & Walker, H. (2011). Sustainable procurement in the public sector: an 
international comparative study. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 31(4), 452-476. doi:10.1108/01443571111119551 
Bratt, C., Hallstedt, S., Robèrt, K. H., Broman, G., & Oldmark, J. (2013). Assessment of 
criteria development for public procurement from a strategic sustainability 
perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production, 52(0), 309-316. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.02.007 
Carter, C., & Jennings, M. (2004). The role of purchasing in corporate social responsibility: a 
structural equation analysis. Journal of Business Logistics, 25(1), 145-186.  
Clegg, S. R., & Rura-Polley, T. (1998). Jeffrey Pfeffer (1946-) and Gerald R. Salancik (1943-
96). In M. Warner (Ed.), The IEBM Handbook of Management Thinking (pp. 537-
543). London: IEBM. 
Constructing Excellence in Wales. (2012). Community Benefits Policies in Construction: 
Evaluating the Impacts. Welsh Government. Retrieved from 
http://www.cewales.org.uk/files/6214/4121/1554/6903CEW-ComBenefitReport-F.pdf  
Cox, A., & Ireland, P. (2002). Managing construction supply chains: the common sense 
approach. Engineering Construction & Architectural Management, 9(5/6), 409-418.  
Dania, W. A. P., Xing, K., & Amer, Y. (2018). Collaboration behavioural factors for 
sustainable agri-food supply chains: A systematic review. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 186, 851-864. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.03.148 
Donaldson, L. (1995). American Anti-Management Theories of Organizations. Cambridge. 
24 
 
Drees, J. M., & Heugens, P. (2013). Synthesizing and Extending Resource Dependence 
Theory: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Management, 39(6), 1666-1698. 
doi:10.1177/0149206312471391 
Eadie, R., McKeown, C., & Anderson, K. (2011). The Social Element of Sustainable Civil 
Engineering Public Procurement in Northern Ireland. International Journal of 
Business and Social Science, 2(12), 36-43.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532-550. doi:10.2307/258557 
Erridge, A., & Henningan, S. (2007). Public Procurement and Social Policy in Northern 
Ireland: The Unemployment Pilot Project. In G. Piga & K. V. Thai (Eds.), Advancing 
Public Procurement: Practices, Innovation and Knowledge-sharing (pp. 280-303). 
Boca Raton, FL: PrAcademics Press. 
EUROPA. (2020). EU public procurement. Retrieved from ttps://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-
market/public-procurement_en:  
European Commission. (2010). Buying Social: A Guide to Taking Account of Social 
Considerations in Public Procurement. Retrieved from Luxenbourg:  
Fawcett, S. E., Waller, M. A., Miller, J. W., Schwieterman, M. A., Hazen, B. T., & 
Overstreet, R. E. (2014). A Trail Guide to Publishing Success: Tips on Writing 
Influential Conceptual, Qualitative, and Survey Research. Journal of Business 
Logistics, 35(1), 1-16. doi:10.1111/jbl.12039 
Flynn, A., & Davies, P. (2014). Theory in public procurement research. Journal of Public 
Procurement, 14(2), 139-180.  
Foerstl, K., Azadegan, A., Leppelt, T., & Hartmann, E. (2015). Drivers of supplier 
sustainability: moving beyond compliance to commitment. Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 51(1), 67-92. doi:10.1111/jscm.12067 
Furneaux, C., & Barraket, J. (2014). Purchasing social good(s): a definition and typology of 
social procuremen. Public Money & Management, 34(4), 265-272.  
Gehman, J., Glaser, V. L., Eisenhardt, K. M., Gioia, D., Langley, A., & Corley, K. G. (2018). 
Finding Theory-Method Fit: A Comparison of Three Qualitative Approaches to 
Theory Building. Journal of Management Inquiry, 27(3), 284-300. 
doi:10.1177/1056492617706029 
Gold, S., Seuring, S., & Beske, P. (2010). Sustainable supply chain management and 
inter‐organizational resources: a literature review. Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Management, 17(4), 230-245.  
Gormly, J. (2014). What are the challenges to sustainable procurement in commercial semi-
state bodies in Ireland? , 14(3), 395-445.  
Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth Generation Evaluation. Newbury Park: Sage. 
Hall, J. (2000). Environmental supply chain dynamics. Journal of Cleaner Production, 8,455-
471. 
Halldorsson, A., & Aastrup, J. (2003). Quality criteria for qualitative inquiries in logistics. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 144, 321-332.  
Handfield, R. B. (1993). A resource dependence perspective of Just-in-Time purchasing. 
Journal of Operations Management, 11, 289-311.  
Harland, C., Telgen, J., Callendar, G., Grimm, R., & Patrucco, A. (2019). Implementing 
government policy in supply chains: An international coproduction study of public 
procurement. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 55(2), 6-25.  
Hawkins, T. G., Gravier, M. J., & Powley, E. H. (2011). Public Versus Private Sector 
Procurement Ethics and Strategy: What Each Sector can Learn from the Other. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 103(4), 567-586. Retrieved from 
25 
 
http://www.swetswise.com/swoc-web/link/access_db?issn=1573-
0697&vol=00103&iss=00004&page=567&year=2011 
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M., & Collins, B. J. (2009). Resource Dependence Theory: A 
Review. Journal of Management, 36(6), 1404-1427.  
HM Treasury. (2017). Whole of Government Accounts UK Government 2017.  
Hoejmose, S. U., & Adrien-Kirby, A. J. (2012). Socially and environmentally responsible 
procurement: A literature review and future research agenda of a managerial issue in 
the 21st century. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 18(4), 232-242. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2012.06.002 
Huq, F. A., Stevenson, M., & Zorzini, M. (2014). Social sustainability in developing country 
suppliers An exploratory study in the ready made garments industry of Bangladesh. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 34(5), 610-638. 
doi:10.1108/ijopm-10-2012-0467 
i2i. (2008). CAN DO toolkit Community benefits in procurement. Retrieved from 
http://www.cih.org/resources/PDF/i2i/Cando_toolkit_refresh.pdf  
Kalaitzi, D., Matopoulos, A., & Clegg, B. (2019). Managing resource dependencies in 
electric vehicle supply chains: a multi-tier case study. Supply Chain Management-an 
International Journal, 24(2), 256-270. doi:10.1108/scm-03-2018-0116 
Ketokivi, M., & Choi, T. (2014). Renaissance of case research as a scientific method. Journal 
of Operations Management, 32(5), 232-240. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2014.03.004 
Loosemore, M. (2016). Social procurement in UK construction projects. International 
Journal of Project Management, 34, 133-144.  
Lund-Thomsen, P., & Costa, N. (2011). Sustainable Procurement in the United Nations. 
Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 42, 54-72.  
Lynch, J., Uenk, N., Walker, H., & Schotanus, F. (2016). Community Benefits of Public 
Procurement: A Comparison between Local Governments in Wales (UK) and the 
Netherlands. Paper presented at the IPSERA Conference, Dortmund.  
Macfarlane, R. (2014). Tackling Poverty through Public Procurement: Law, Policy and 
Practice in Delivering Community Benefits and Social Value. Retrieved from 
https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/tackling-poverty-through-public-procurement  
McCrudden, C. (2004). Using public procurement to achieve social outcomes. Natural 
Resources Forum, 28(4), 257-267. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://000226042000003 
McKevitt, D., & Davis, P. (2016). Value for money: a broken piñata? Public Money & 
Management, 36(4), 257-264.  
Meehan, J., & Bryde, D. J. (2014). Procuring sustainably in social housing: The role of social 
capital. Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 20, 74-81.  
Meehan, J., & Bryde, D. J. (2015). A field-level examination of the adoption of sustainable 
procurement in the social housing sector. International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, 35(7), 982-1004. doi:10.1108/ijopm-07-2014-0359 
Meinlschmidt, J., Schleper, M. C., & Foerstl, K. (2018). Tackling the sustainability iceberg: 
A transaction cost economics approach to lower tier sustainability management. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 38(10), 1888-1914. 
doi:10.1108/ijopm-03-2017-0141 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth 
and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363.  
Miemczyk, J., Johnsen, T., & Macquet, M. (2012). Sustainable Purchasing and Supply 
Management: A structured literature review of definitions and measures at the dyad, 
supply chain and network levels. Supply Chain Management: an International 
Journal, 17(5), 1-20.  
26 
 
Miles, M., & Huberman, A. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook 
(2nd Edition ed.). Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications. 
Mont, O., & Leire, C. (2009). Socially responsible purchasing in supply chains: drivers and 
barriers in Sweden. Social Responsibility Journal, 5(3), 388-407.  
National Procurement Service. (2020). National Procurement Service.  
Nienhüser, W. (2008). Resource Dependence Theory How well does it Explain Behavior of 
Organizations? Management Revue, 19(1), 9-32.  
Nijaki, L. K., & Worrel, G. (2012). Procurement for sustainable local economic developmen. 
International Journal of Public Sector Managementt, 25(2), 133-153.  
OJEU. (2020). Official Journal of the European Union. Retrieved from 
https://ted.europa.eu/TED/main/HomePage.doc:  
Pazirandeh, A., & Norrman, A. (2014). An interrelation model of power and purchasing 
strategies: A study of vaccine purchase for developing countries. Journal of 
Purchasing and Supply Management, 20(1), 41-53. doi:10.1016/j.pursup.2013.11.002 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). The External Control of Organizations. New York: Harper 
and Rowe. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. Stanford: Stanford Business Books. 
Pratt, M. G. (2009). For the lack of a boilerplate: tips on writing up (and reviewing) 
qualitative research. Academy of Management Journal, 52(5), 856-862. 
doi:10.5465/amj.2009.44632557 
Preuss, L. (2007). Buying into our future: The range of sustainability initiatives in local 
government procurement. Business Strategy and the Environment, 16(5), 354-365.  
Preuss, L. (2009). Addressing sustainable development through public procurement: the case 
of local government. Supply Chain Management: an International Journal, 14(3), 
213–223.  
Preuss, L., & Walker, H. (2011). Psychological barriers in the road to sustainable 
development: Evidence from public sector procurement. Public Administration, 89(2), 
493-521.  
Quarshie, A. M., Salmi, A., & Leuschner, R. (2016). Sustainability and corporate social 
responsibility in supply chains: The state of research in supply chain management and 
business ethics journals. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 22(2), 82-
97. doi:10.1016/j.pursup.2015.11.001 
Roman, A. V. (2017). Institutionalizing sustainability: A structural equation model of 
sustainable procurement in US public agencies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 143, 
1048-1059. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.12.014 
Salancik, G., & Pfeffer, J. (1974). The Bases and Use of Power in Organizational Decision 
Making: The Case of a University. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19(4), 453-473.  
Sell2Wales. (2020). Sell2Wales.  
Seuring, S., & Muller, M. (2008). From a literature review to a conceptual framework for 
sustainable supply chain management. Journal of Cleaner Production, 16(15), 1699-
1710. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2008.04.020 
Sherer, P. D., & Lee, K. (2002). Institutional change in large law firms: A resource 
dependency and institutional perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 
102-119. doi:10.2307/3069287 
Snider, K. F., Halpern, B. H., Rendon, R. G., & Kidalov, M. V. (2013). Corporate social 
responsibility and public procurement: How supplying government affects managerial 
orientations. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 19(2), 63-72. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2013.01.001 
27 
 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures 
and techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Sutherland, V., McTier, A., Glass, A., & McGregor, A. (2015). Analysis of the Impact and 
Value of Community Benefit Clauses in Procurement. Retrieved from 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/06/6812/downloads  
Tachizawa, E. M., & Wong, C. Y. (2014). Towards a theory of multi-tier sustainable supply 
chains: a systematic literature review. Supply Chain Management-an International 
Journal, 19(5-6), 643-663. doi:10.1108/scm-02-2014-0070 
Touboulic, A., Chicksand, D., & Walker, H. (2014). Managing Imbalanced Supply Chain 
Relationships for Sustainability: A Power Perspective. Decision Sciences, 45(4), 577-
619. doi:10.1111/deci.12087 
Touboulic, A., & Walker, H. (2015). Theories in sustainable supply chain management: a 
structured literature review. International Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, 45(1-2), 16-42. doi:10.1108/ijpdlm-05-2013-0106 
UK Government. (2006). Government of Wales Act 2006. Retrieved from 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/32/contents:  
Universities UK. (2020). University spending explained. Retrieved from 
https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/facts-and-stats/Documents/university-spending-
explained-summary.pdf; 
https://chcymru.org.uk/uploads/general/2018_Economic_Impact_of_Welsh_HA_sect
or_Report_FINAL.pdf:  
Uttam, K., & Roos, C. L. L. (2015). Competitive dialogue procedure for sustainable public 
procurement. Journal of Cleaner Production, 86, 403-416. 
doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.08.031 
Walker, H., & Brammer, S. (2012). The relationship between sustainable procurement and e-
procurement in the public sector. International Journal of Production Economics, 
140(1), 256-268. doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.01.008 
Walker, H., & Jones, N. (2011). Sustainable supply chain management across the UK private 
sector. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal,, 17(1).  
Walker, H., & Phillips, W. (2009). Sustainable procurement: emerging issues. Journal of 
Public Procurement, 2(1), 41-61.  
Walker, H., & Preuss, L. (2008). Fostering sustainability through sourcing from small 
businesses: public sector perspectives. Journal of Cleaner Production, 16(15), 1600-
1609.  
Welsh Government. (2014). Community benefits guidance – Delivering maximum value for 
the Welsh pound. Retrieved from 
http://gov.wales/docs/dpsp/publications/valuewales/140904-community-benefit-
report-en.pdf:  
Welsh Government. (2015). Welsh Procurement Policy Statement. Retrieved from 
https://gov.wales/docs/prp/toolkit/june15walesprocurementpolicystatement2015v1.pd
f:  
Welsh Government. (2019). Prosperity for All. 
https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2019-02/prosperity-for-all-economic-
action-plan.pdf.  
Welsh Government. (2020). Government finance in Wales. Retrieved from 
https://law.gov.wales/constitution-government/government-in-
wales/finance/?lang=en#/constitution-government/government-in- 
wales/finance/?tab=overview&lang=en   
 
 
28 
 
Xu, Q., Hu, Q. Q., Chin, T. C., Chen, C., Shi, Y., & Xu, J. X. (2019). How Supply Chain 
Integration Affects Innovation in a Digital Age: Moderating Effects of Sustainable 
Policy. Sustainability, 11(19). doi:10.3390/su11195460 
Yin, R. (2014). Case study research: design and methods (5th Edition ed.). London: Sage 
publications. 
Zorzini, M., Hendry, L. C., Huq, F. A., & Stevenson, M. (2015). Socially responsible 
sourcing: reviewing the literature and its use of theory. International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 35(1), 60-109. doi:10.1108/ijopm-07-2013-
0355 
 
[Insert Appendix about here] 
 
 
 
 
  
29 
 
Figure 1: Achieving Community Benefits through procurement (Welsh Government, 2014, 
p.12)  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Abductive theorizing process between RDT and case data 
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Figure 3: A conceptual model of public procurement through an RDT lens 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Revised conceptual model of RDT and additional themes in grey influencing CB 
implementation  
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Table 1 Main features of public bodies participating in study 
 
 
Public sector 
organisation 
Local Authorities 
(LAs) 
Registered Social 
Landlords (RSLs) 
Higher Education 
Institutes (HEs) 
Function Provision of local 
government services 
Provision of 
affordable housing 
Education and 
research 
Key stakeholders Welsh Government 
Local businesses 
Electors 
Welsh Government 
Tenants 
Welsh Government 
Other funders 
Students 
Accountability 
(Regulator) 
Welsh Government 
Electorate 
Welsh Government’s 
Housing Regulation 
Team  
Higher Education 
Funding Council for 
Wales HEFCW 
Funding 
structure 
Revenue Support Grant 
(Welsh Government) 
about 75% of income. 
Business rates and 
Council Tax 
Social Housing 
Grants (Welsh 
Government) 
Rental income 
Local Authority 
grants or loans. 
Running costs: rental 
income. 
New homes: Grants 
and loans. 
Around 16% of 
funding comes 
directly from 
government sources 
(Teaching fees 
represent the largest 
percentage of 
income 44%)  
 
Legislation 
 
The Local Government 
Act 1972  
Local Government 
(Wales) Act 1994 
Housing Act 1996 
 
1996 Higher 
Education (Wales) 
Act 2015 
All three tabled public bodies are required to comply with the Public 
Contracts Regulations 2015; Well-Being of Future Generations 
(Wales) Act 2015; and to follow the Welsh Government’s 
Procurement Policy Statement.  
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Table 2: Overview of participants by sector and main role in organisation 
 
Case 
Study 
Participant 
Code 
Participants’ key roles Time Taken 
Hours Minutes 
H
ig
h
er
 E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 s
u
p
p
li
er
s 
HE1.A Contract Manager 0 45 
HE1.B Director (Estates) 0 20 
HE1.C Contract Manager 1 19 
HE1.D Procurement Director 0 56 
HE2 Procurement Director 0 46 
HE3 Procurement Director 0 52 
S1 Community Benefits Co-ordinator 1 46 
S2&S3 Contract Manager and Training Manager 1 33 
S4 Managing Director/Contract Manager 1 31 
S5 Community Benefits Co-ordinator/Contract Manager 1 15 
S6 Community Benefits Co-ordinator 0 45 
L
o
ca
l 
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
 o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 s
u
p
p
li
er
s 
LA1.A Contract Manager (Estates) 1 7 
LA1.B Contract Manager (Social care) 0 48 
LA1.C Community Benefits Co-ordinator 2   
LA1.D Procurement Director 1 35 
LA1.E Contract Manager (Catering) 0 38 
LA2 Community Benefits Co-ordinator 0 54 
LA3.A & B Procurement Director and Community Benefits Co-ordinator 1 28 
LA3.A1 
14 focus group participants with responsibilities including the 
procurement, environment, education, social services, 
construction, buildings maintenance and corporate services 
4 30 
LA4.A Contract Manager (Property Maintenance) 1 34 
LA4.B Contract Manager (Housing) 0 56 
LA4.C&D Procurement Manager and Community Benefits Co-ordinator 1 03 
LA5 Procurement Director 0 58 
S7 Managing Director/Contract Manager 1 17 
S8 Community Benefits Co-ordinator 0 44 
S9.A,B&C 
Managing Director; Contract Manager; Community Benefits  Co-
ordinator 
1 34 
S10.A&B Contract Manager & Community Benefits Co-ordinator 1 38 
S11 Contract Manager 0 43 
R
eg
is
te
r
ed
 S
o
ci
a
l 
H
o
u
si
n
g
 
o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 s
u
p
p
li
er
s 
RSL1 Procurement Director 1 36 
RSL2 Community Benefits Co-ordinator 1 44 
RSL3.A Procurement Director 0 55 
RSL3.A1 
16 focus group participants with responsibilities including 
procurement, contract management, employability skills, 
community engagement 
4 30 
S12 Contract Manager/Health & Safety Co-ordinator 0 50 
S13 Contract Manager/Business Development Manager 0 56 
S14 Managing Director/Contract Manager 0 52 
S15 Contract Manager 0 57 
S16 Managing Director/Contract Manager 1 44 
S17 Community Benefits Co-ordinator 1 19 
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Table 3: Qualitative research criteria steps 
 
Criteria Steps taken to achieve 
Credibility Purposive selection of participants with experience of implementing CBs 
Adoption of established theory (RDT) to explore the extent to which dependence 
on resources could compromise or facilitate CBs implementation and to explore 
resource-based solutions 
Dependability Comparing CBs implementation in a range of contexts including a dyadic approach 
Ensuring participants with different roles for implementation were included 
wherever possible 
Verification of interview records with participants prior to analysis 
Maintaining a chain of evidence linking records to the coding of findings 
Confirmability Considered in the development of the interview protocol 
Selecting participants with a wide range of backgrounds and experience 
Minimising the risk of researcher bias when collecting and analyzing data 
Copying data directly from agreed interview records into coding sheets 
A summary of findings was presented to participants at a CIPS event, attended by 
buyers and suppliers, and feedback was collected 
Transferability Data collected according to an interview protocol 
Comparing results across participant groups and types 
Linking findings to a review of the academic and grey literature 
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Table 4 RDT elements, challenges and enablers of CBs implementation  
 
RDT INTER/ 
INTRA 
RDT element and supporting 
literature 
Challenges Enablers  
R
E
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
 
INTER Buyers control resources on which 
suppliers depend and can influence 
the behavior of suppliers (Baum and 
Oliver, 1991; Touboulic et al., 2014) 
Suppliers feel obliged to 
implement CBs to win 
contracts, yet it is not 
cost-neutral 
Buyers could undertake pre-
market engagement to 
understand suppliers’ concerns 
about the potential impact of 
their demands  
Organisations are linked by a range of 
external relationships (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003). Lack of policy 
framework and process alignment. 
Potential conflict between goals and 
objectives (Erridge and Hennigan, 
2012; Preuss, 2011) 
Welsh government has 
particular power, and 
agencies are key to 
enabling TR&T 
Buyers can develop guidance 
on accessing agencies that can 
provide links to beneficiaries or 
training funds. Consider shared 
apprenticeship schemes. 
Organisations prefer dealing with 
organisations or individuals they 
know (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) 
SMEs may be squeezed 
out of market; restricted 
to a few larger suppliers 
Buyers can encourage suppliers 
to run supplier development 
programmes. 
The organisation must transact with 
organisations that control access to 
resources, including the exchange of 
money, physical resources, 
information, expertise or social 
legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003) 
A lack of 
communication and 
sharing expertise can 
hinder CBs 
Information and expertise 
exchanges can maximise the 
potential for CBs delivery. 
Organisations require a steady flow of 
resource exchanges to operate 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) 
Collaborative 
procurement can lead to 
shorter fixed term 
contracts, which reduce 
certainty of suppliers 
Suppliers need greater contract 
certainty, or for buyers to be 
more flexible in their selection 
of CBs types.  
INTRA The organisation should identify 
critical resources needed and who 
controls them (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1974; Preuss, 2009; Mont and Leire, 
2009; Eadie et al., 2011). Ambiguous 
internal goals (Lund-Thomsen and 
Costa, 2011; Preuss; 2009; Sutherland 
et al., 2015) 
If those controlling 
resources are not on 
board internally it can 
hinder CBs. Does CBs 
align with organisational 
strategy? 
Ensure adequate resources and 
managerial support. Involve 
key internal actors earlier in 
implementation. Clearly 
communicate goals within 
buyer and supplier orgs 
P
O
W
E
R
 
INTER Buyers and sellers are interdependent 
but the relationship may be 
asymmetric according to the balance 
of power (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
Individuals and organisations have to 
determine whose competing demands 
to prioritise (Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003) 
Buyers decide who wins 
contracts, but suppliers 
are the ones who 
implement CBs. Degree 
of dependency each way 
Buyers and suppliers need to 
recognise interdependence, 
buyers need to recognise costs, 
suppliers need to be more 
transparent about cost/tensions. 
Buyers and suppliers may develop 
closer relationships to influence the 
relative power balance (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003; Cox et al., 2002; 
Drees and Heugens, 2013). Buyers 
may fail to understand the 
implications of CBs for contractors.  
Potential new suppliers 
may be disadvantaged as 
they do not have 
relationships with 
suppliers 
Good communication and 
closer liaison between buyers 
and suppliers. Meet the buyer 
events are helpful. Increased 
flexibility. Realistic targets. 
Legislation and regulations can be 
used as mediators to control market 
forces. Some concentration of power 
needed to achieve collective 
outcomes (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003; Sutherland et al., 2015). 
Welsh government has 
conflicting policy 
agendas, but has the 
power to push for CBs 
agenda 
Policy-makers need to be 
aware of unintended 
consequences and consider 
how they might be mitigated. 
Policy-makers need to provide 
greater clarity in guidance and 
processes 
INTRA The power of a department to 
influence actions is linked to the 
amount of resources it controls 
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974) 
Influential actors can 
hinder CBs 
Identify critical resources 
needed for implementation and 
who controls them 
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Appendix: Example interview questions for public sector participants  
Can you tell me about your role in implementing CBs across this organisation?  
Can you tell me more about who is involved in delivering CBs within your organisation? 
Can you identify any drivers or pressures that have led to including CBs in contracts? 
How have CBs been integrated within the wider organisation’s strategy, policies or 
procedures?  
How is the approach communicated to those involved in procurement? (internal, external) 
How is the approach communicated to potential suppliers? 
How is your relationship with your suppliers that implement CBs? 
Are you dependent on your suppliers? Are they dependent on you?  
How have suppliers responded to your approach?  
Do responsive suppliers win contracts? Other resources? 
What would you do if a tenderer failed to submit a CB plan? 
What factors do you consider have enabled implementation of CBs? 
What kinds of challenges have you encountered in implementing CBs? (internal, external) 
What forms of monitoring are in place to ensure CBs are delivered?  
What forms of incentives or penalties are in place to ensure compliance and are they 
enforced?  
How are CBs reported, both internally and externally?  
What are the benefits to your organisation and others from implementing CBs?  
Can you think of examples of expected CBs not being realised?  
 
